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[The following article is reproduced with permission of the Washington-based Council on
Hemispheric Affairs (COHA). It was published in the Oct. 9, 1992 edition of COHA's biweekly
publication, "Washington Report on the Hemisphere."] Recent moves in Latin America towards
strengthening democratic institutions and encouraging economic expansion have led many
observers to celebrate a hemispheric "miracle" almost as noteworthy as the end of communism
in Eastern Europe. Once a scene of sinister military strongmen ruling moribund economies, Latin
America's debt crisis is now seen as all but resolved, free market reforms appear to be preparing the
ground for an unprecedented economic boom, and democratic politics are supposedly entrenched
throughout the region. But another look at these findings may reveal another line of analysis. Even
though more than US$220 billion have left the region since 1982 in profit remittances and interest
payments on foreign debt, more is now owed to foreign creditors than when the debt crisis first
erupted in the early 1980s. Foreign indebtedness rose from US$333 billion in 1982 to US$429 billion
in 1991 in spite of the Brady and Baker debt reduction plans.* While the rate of increase is likely to
decline in the next few years, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) still estimates that the
figure will top US$460 billion by the year 2000. Improvements Hurt Living Standards for the Poor
One reason why anxiety over debt levels seems to have eased in Latin America is that it is costing
most countries relatively less to service their overseas obligations than before, although many still
devote an alarming 15 to 20% of export earnings to interest payments. Also, overseas commercial
banks have dramatically cut back their exposure in the region since writing down some of the illadvised loans made during the reckless surplus petro-dollar days. Those loans were contracted by
their corruption-prone military borrowers of the 1970's and early 1980's. But while the bankers are
less apprehensive right now, the diversion of scarce funds to service overseas debts (US$17 billion
in 1991), rather than to meet pressing social and development needs at home, seriously erodes
popular support for still fragile civilian governments. Proponents of the "Latin miracle" cite a sharp
increase in net capital inflow for 1991 (estimated at between US$36 and US$40 billion) as a sure
sign of an economic turnaround. But the lion's share of the inflow is going to Mexico and should be
considered "anxious" money that could just as easily flee at the first sign of trouble. A good deal of
it also represents accelerated government borrowing to pay off recently laid off public workers or
to prepare enterprises to be sold off. Meanwhile, deregulated economies in the region have opened
up lucrative opportunities for US exports, which increased by 29% between 1990 and 1991. Case
Studies of Successful Stories Much is made of the noteworthy recent macroeconomic records of
Chile and Venezuela. But Chile's growth rate in the 1980's was lower than in the 1960's and 1970's,
and although its GDP grew by 5.8% in 1991, these figures should be compared to an average 4.6%
figure for the decade between 1961 and 1971. In 1991, Venezuela posted a record growth rate of
9.2%, largely resulting from upward pressure on oil prices as a result of the Persian Gulf War.
Before then, there had been a 50% decline in real wages between 1988 and 1991 and a tripling of
the proportion of those living below the poverty line between 1984 (11%) and 1991 (33%), which
may help explain the near success of last February's attempted military coup against President
©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute.
All rights reserved.

Page 1 of 2

LADB Article Id: 058401
ISSN: 1060-4189

Carlos Andres Perez. How Much Growth Has There Been? The region's economic restructuring in
recent years has not necessarily set the stage for significant growth in the 1990's. Much of the new
investment in the region has gone into buying up state-owned companies at bargain-basement
prices, providing the government with one-shot revenue from the sale of valuable public assets.
Nor does privatization necessarily lead to more competition; often, it is simply a means of making
private monopolies of public ones. Privatization also requires that profits go to stockholders rather
than to the national treasury, which can mean that revenues that once went to local development
programs now go as remittances to overseas parent companies. As a result of privatizations in 1986
and 1987, the Chilean government, for example, is expected to lose between US$100 and US$165
million in public revenues it could have expected annually between 1990-95. The social costs of
restructuring economies are producing serious medium- and long-term problems, as declining
health and education expenditures reduce the contribution that the next generation can make
to the region's future economic performance. UN estimates indicate that 44% of Latin America's
population was living in poverty in 1991; in Central America it is as much as 60%. The inadvertent
marriage between free-market ideology and state violence, which could occasionally be observed
throughout the late 1980s, deserves close scrutiny. Several of the most ardent practitioners of
the neo-liberal faith have compromised democratic processes in their countries by engaging in
crackdowns on those opposing the often harsh consequences of "stabilization" programs. Peru's
President Alberto Fujimori, for instance, orchestrated his "auto golpe" in April in part to protect
the draconian measures, which were becoming increasingly necessary to reinforce his free- market
formulas in the face of widespread popular opposition. The same is proving true elsewhere in Latin
America, such as in Ecuador and the Dominican Republic and several other countries. Rather than
a sustained commitment to authentic Latin American democracy, privatization is the centerpiece
of Washington's regional policy, even at the risk that a new cycle of military dictatorships sworn
to uphold such objectives, if not constitutional values, may be in store for the region if civilian
governments cannot achieve social justice along with economic stability. *[Editor's note: The Brady
and Baker plans were debt reduction schemes drawn up by Nicholas Brady and James Baker, the
present and former US Treasury Secretaries, respectively.]
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